Has The Informativeness Of Accounting Numbers Improved After Accounting Regulations In Korea? by Kang, Sun-A & Chun, Sung-Bin
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2009 Volume 8, Number 7 
29 
Has The Informativeness Of Accounting 
Numbers Improved After Accounting 
Regulations In Korea? 
Sun-A Kang, Sogang University, Seoul, Korea 
Sung-Bin Chun, Sogang University, Seoul, Korea 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper aims to examine whether the level of Earnings Management (EM) and informativeness 
of accounting information change after the enforcement of Internal Accounting Control System 
(IACS) Standards established by the Korea Listed Firms Association, introduced as one of the 
Accounting Reforms. We test the effectiveness of IACS standards using samples of listed large 
firms that were required to adopt IACS Standards from 2006 and of listed small and medium firms 
that did not have to adopt IACS Standards to implement IACS as non-adopters. We use absolute 
values of discretionary accruals as proxies for EM estimated by three models: (1) the Modified 
Jones model, (2) the Performance Matched model, and (3) the Forward Looking model. We test 
the hypothesis that there are changes in the level of earnings management before and after the 
enforcement of IACS Standards for adopters using multivariate regression models. We also test 
the change in the informativeness of accounting information before and after the enforcement of 
IACS Standards using earnings response coefficients (ERC) between earnings and returns for 
both samples. It was found that the level of EM is significantly reduced and the level of 
informativeness is improved after the enforcement of IACS Standards for adopters, while the 
levels of EM and informativeness are not significantly changed for not-adopters. Other control 
variables, such as cash flows from operations, size, debt ratio, and trends variables also turned 
out to be significant in explaining EM. The results imply that the reliability and the transparency 
of Korean firms' financial statements were improved by the enforcement of IACS Standards as 
they reduce earnings management. Also the informativeness of accounting numbers was increased 
after the enforcement of IACS Standards. This paper provides initial empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of IACS Standards enforced in 2006. 
 
Keywords:  Internal Accounting Control System Standards, Earnings Management, Informativeness of accounting 
information 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
n internal accounting control system (IACS)
1
 is a sub-part of the internal control system that is 
developed and operated within a firm to provide a reasonable confidence to users whether the 
financial statements provided by the firm are prepared and announced according to the generally 
accepted accounting standards. The IACS of Korea is mainly based on the COSO
2
 Framework of the US and was 
introduced for the first time in 2001, just after the Korean economic crisis, with very limited application area
3
. It 
started to be regularized in full scale through Korean Accounting Reforms at the end of 2003 where relevant laws 
were amended to incorporate the essence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S.A. Since 2004, IACS was 
                                           
1 „IACS‟ and „Standards‟ in this paper have the same meaning of Internal Control over Financial Reporting (ICFR) and the Best 
Practice Guideline of ICFR, respectably in Korea. 
2 The official name is „the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission‟. 
3 IACS was required only for companies undergoing restructuring at that time. 
A 
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required for all firms
4
 with assets equal to or greater than 7 billion Korean Won, but there was no operational 
guideline for companies to practically implement IACS.  
 
In June 2005, Korea Listed Firms Association established the IACS Standards so that companies can 
implement IACS in more systematic way to ensure the effectiveness of the system. The IACS Standards is a kind of 
guidelines to provide rigorous principles to follow when managers design and operate as well as evaluate IACS 
within a firm. The Standards are intended to increase reliability of financial statements provided by firms. Since the 
Standards are supposed to be costly to adopt in the first year (2006) of their enforcement, only large listed firms 
were mandated to follow them. Since 2007, all other listed firms, small and medium-sized, were required to adopt 
the Standards in implementing IACS. Even though those standards are not perfect in the sense that they do not 
reflect different natures of industries and/or different business environments, they are expected to increase the 
quality and usefulness of accounting information. 
 
This paper aims to examine whether the level of earnings management (EM) and informativeness of 
accounting information change before and after the enforcement of IACS Standards for adapters. The same analysis 
was performed for a control group, non-adopters
5
 to compare with the adopters. If only adopters show improved 
quality and informativeness of accounting information, it can be concluded that IACS Standards were effective in 
successfully implementing IACS in Korea. We use absolute values of discretionary accruals estimated by 3 different 
models: (1)the Modified Jones model, (2)the Performance matched model, and (3)the Forward looking model as 
proxies for EM. We employ earnings response coefficients (ERC) between earnings and returns, to measure the 
informativeness.  
 
The empirical results indicate that the level of EM is significantly reduced for firms that adopted IACS 
Standards in 2006 and the adopters showed a stronger relationship between earnings and returns. On the other hand, 
non-adapters, small and medium sized firms, showed no significant changes in EM and ERC before and after the 
enforcement of IACS Standards.  
 
This study differs from the prior researches dealing with the internal control system in that it examines the 
effectiveness of IACS Standards by comparing prior to and after the IACS Standards application for both adopters 
and non-adopters of the Standards. It also analyzed the change of the informativeness of accounting numbers before 
and after the enforcement of IACS Standards for both adopters and non-adopters. Our study contributes to the 
literature in that it is the first empirical test on the effectiveness of IACS Standards in Korea.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant prior researches and 
derives hypotheses. Section 3 explains about sample selection and the empirical model. The empirical results are 
described in Section 4 followed by the conclusion in Section 5. 
 
II.  HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
There is a paucity of studies on earnings management, comparing post- and pre-SOX period, and the 
results are not consistent. Jain and Rezaee (2004) study accounting conservatism and the impacts on EM after the 
passage of SOX in the US. They document there is no significant increase in conservatism of financial reporting 
after SOX using a book-to-market ratio as a proxy for conservatism. They also find positive abnormal returns 
around the events that increase the likelihood of the passage of SOX, implying the market‟s expectation for 
increased quality of accounting information. Cohen and Lys (2005) compare the level of accrual-based EM in the 
pre- and post-SOX periods. They document an increasing trend in accrual-based EM in the period up to the passage 
of SOX and a reversal after the passage of SOX. They argue the option-based compensation is the main reason why 
there is a significant decrease of accrual-based EM after the passage of SOX. They also document that there are no 
significant changes in the volatility of stock returns measured by the variance of stock returns and cumulative stock 
                                           
4 All firms audited by an external auditor according to the Act of External Audit of Corporations in Korea. 
5 The Standards has been enforced to large listed firms and small and medium sized public firms since 2006 and 2007, 
respectably. Small and Medium sized public firms are allowed to apply a less strict approach in IACS design and operation 
when adopting the Standards. 
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returns between pre- and post-SOX period, implying the usefulness of accounting information is not affected. On the 
other hand, Jain and Rezaee (2004) show that the usefulness of accounting earnings is slightly increased after the 
SOX when they measure the usefulness with total accruals and market response to good news and bad news.  
 
We have only a few studies on IACS in Korea. Cho and Yoo (2006) examine whether there is a change in 
the reliability of reported earnings after the IACS was implemented using discretionary accruals (DA). They find a 
significant decrease of DA estimated by the Modified Jones model after the implementation of IACS for those firms 
that received a fair opinion on IACS review report by auditors. However, those firms that received internal control 
deficiency (ICD) from their auditors show higher DAs. But they use very small number of sample firms that are 
listed on the Korean Securities Dealers' automated quotation (KOSDAQ
6
), and this makes it hard to generalize the 
result. Shin (2007) performed a similar study including non-listed firms in 2005, before the enforcement of IACS 
Standards. He compares DAs between firms with weak IACS and firms with strong IACS based upon auditor‟s 
opinion on IACS. He reports a significant positive relation between earnings management and the quality of IC.  
 
Adaptors of IACS Standards, large listed firms, follow an internal accounting control system in accordance 
with standardized process stipulated in the Standards from 2006 whereas non-adopters, small and medium sized 
firms, follow it from 2007. We expect managers‟ ability to control their earnings is reduced for adapters after the 
enforcement of IACS Standards. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  EM of adopters is reduced after the enforcement of IACS Standards.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1-1.  EM of non-adopters is not changed after the enforcement of IACS Standards. 
 
We attempt to examine whether accounting informativeness is changed after the enforcement of IACS 
Standards for adopters. We expect the relationship between accounting earnings and stock returns is more improved 
than before if the reliability on accounting information is increased by adopting IACS Standards. This leads to the 
following hypotheses. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.  Accounting informativeness of adopters is improved after the enforcement of IACS Standards. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2-1.  Accounting informativeness of non-adopters is not changed after the enforcement of IACS 
Standards. 
 
III.  RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
3.1  Models 
 
We aim to examine changes in earnings management and changes in accounting informativeness for 
Korean listed firms after the enforcement of IACS Standards to test its effectiveness. We use the following 
multivariate regression to test hypotheses:  
 
[Model 1] 
 
|DAjit| = 𝛂0 + 𝛂1YEARt + 𝛂2| OCFit| + 𝛂3SIZEit + 𝛂4LEVit + 𝛂5TIME + 𝛂6AUDITit + eit (1) 
 
|DA1it| : Absolute value of DA of firm i in year t estimated by the Modified Jones model  
|DA2it| : Absolute value of DA of firm i in year t estimated by the Performance matched model 
|DA3it| : Absolute value of DA of firm i in year t estimated by the Forward looking model 
YEARt : Year dummy for Enforcement of IACS Standards(1 if year t is enforced, 0 otherwise) 
|OCFit| : Absolute value of cash flows from operations 
SIZEit : Natural log of Total assets 
LEVit : Debt ratio of firm i in year t (Total Debt/Total Assets)  
                                           
6 KOSDAQ is the exchange for small and medium firms or ventures, similar to NASDAQ in US. 
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TIME: Trends dummy during 1993-2006(Year t–1992) 
AUDITit : Audit quality dummy of firm i in year t(1 if the external auditor is a Big 4, 0 otherwise)  
 
[Model 1] is to test changes of EM before and after the enforcement of IACS Standards including control 
variables that are expected to influence discretionary accruals (DA). The dependent variable is the absolute value of 
DA estimated by the Modified Jones model, the Performance matched model, and the Forward looking model 
respectably. We employ the absolute value of DA (|DAjit|) to consider the magnitude of EM because earnings 
management can work in either direction. The absolute value of DA was widely used in such studies as Warfield et 
al. (1995) and Choi and Kim (2001). The variable of interest in [Model 1] is YEAR dummy. We expect the 
coefficient of YEAR variable, 𝛂1, to show a negative value if the level of EM for adopters is reduced after the 
enforcement of IACS Standards. 
 
Regarding the informativeness of accounting income, associations between earnings and returns at capital 
markets have been examined continuously since Ball and Brown study (1968) and earnings response coefficients 
(ERC) is commonly used for these analyses. Most prior researches regarding information usefulness examine 
earning/return associations using change variables, which confirm their informativeness, but there is a limitation in 
that this lowers the explanatory power of the model. Easton and Harris (1991) show the level of earnings is more 
relevant in evaluating earning/return associations than changes of earnings. They convert stock variables to flow 
variables as firm's book value and market value are both representing the shareholder's portion, and empirically test 
whether the level of earnings explain the stock returns.  
 
[Model 2] 
RETURNit = 𝛂0 + 𝛂1YEARt + 𝛂2EARNit + 𝛂3YEAREARNit + 𝛂4LOSSit  
 + 𝛂5LOSSEARNit + 𝛂6YEARLOSSEARNit + 𝛂7MVit + eit 
 
(2) 
RETURNit : Stock Returns of firm i in year t [(Changes in Pricet + Dividends) / Pricet-1]  
YEARt : Year dummy for Enforcement of IACS Standards(1 if year t is enforced, 0 otherwise) 
EARNit : Income before tax of firm i in year t(Income before income taxt / Pricet-1]  
YEAREARNit: Income before tax of firm i in year t after the enforcement of IACS Standards (YEARt×EARNit) 
LOSSit : Loss firm dummy(1 if EARNit is negative, 0 otherwise)  
LOSSEARNit : Interaction term(LOSSit×EARNit) 
YEARLOSSEARNit : Interaction term(YEARt×LOSSit×EARNit) 
MVit : Natural log of market value of firm i in year t (Log of MV) 
 
[Model 2] is for testing changes in accounting informativeness after the enforcement of IACS Standards. 
We pay attention to the coefficient of YEAREARNit, 𝛂3, which means the explanatory power of accounting earnings 
on stock returns after the enforcement and expect this ERC to be positive if the reliability of accounting earnings is 
increased after the enforcement of IACS Standards. As prior studies show that associations between earnings and 
returns in the case of loss firms are qualitatively different from ones of firms with positive earnings (Hayn, 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collins et al., 1999), we include LOSSit dummy variable in [Model 2]. We use firm's 
market value
7
 to control for size.  
 
3.2  Measurement of Variables 
 
We employ the absolute value of DA as a proxy of EM and use the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 
1995) and the Forward looking model (Dechow, Rechardson, and Tuna, 2003) to estimate non discretionary accruals 
(NDA). Total accruals (TA) are defined as the difference between net income (NI) and cash flows from operations 
(CFO) following prior studies (Collins and Hribar, 1999; Choi and Back, 1998; Park, 2003). Discretionary accruals 
(DA) are calculated by subtracting NDA from TA. We estimate NDAs using both the Modified Jones model and the 
Forward looking model by industry and year. As we need lots of time series data to estimate NDA using the 
Modified Jones model, we circumvent the problem by estimating it cross-sectionally (Subramanyam, 1996). Bartov 
et al. (2001) document the explanatory power of the Modified Jones model is increased when it estimates NDA 
                                           
7 We use firm's market value for size control in [Model 2] in that it is a test for capital markets and followed by prior studies. We 
have the same result with firms' total assets instead of market values in both [Model 1] and [Model 2]. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2009 Volume 8, Number 7 
33 
cross-sectionally, compared with the Jones model (1991) and the Modified Jones model (1995) with time series data. 
More recently, Dechow et al. (2003) extend the Modified Jones model and develop the Forward looking model with 
higher explanatory power. In the case of Modified Jones model, NDA is estimated by (4) which used coefficients 
from (3) and DA is estimated by (5).   
 
TA/Ait-1 = a0 (1/Ait-1) + a1 (△REV it/Ait-1) + a2 (PPEit/Ait-1) + eit  (3) 
  
NDAit = â0 (1/Ait-1) + â1 [(△REV it – △ARit)/Ait-1] + â2 (PPEit/Ait-1)  (4) 
  
DA1it = (TA it/Ait-1) – NDAit    (5) 
 
TAit : Total accruals of firm i in year t (Net Income – Cash Flows from Operations)  
ΔREVit : Changes in sales of firm i in year t 
ΔARit : Changes in accounts receivables of firm i in year t 
PPEit : Plant, Property, and Equipments of firm i in year t 
Ait-1 : Total assets of firm i at the beginning year t 
DA1it : Discretionary accruals estimated by industry and year using the Modified Jones model of firm i in year t 
NDAit: Non discretionary accruals of firm i in year t 
 
The Forward looking model considers the expected change in accounts receivables for a given change in 
sales, k, and the lagged value of TA to capture the predictable components, because some portion of TA is 
predictable based on the last year's accruals. They also adjust the Modified Jones model by including future sales 
growth. NDA from this model is estimated by (4-1), which used coefficients from (3-1) and (3-2). DA is estimated 
by (5-1).   
 
△ARit = a + k·△ REVit + eit (3-1) 
  
TA/Ait-1 = a0 (1/Ait-1) + a1[{(1+k)△REVit– △ARit}/Ait-1] + a2 (PPEit/Ait-1) + a3 (TA it-1/Ait-2)  
+ a4 (△REVit+1/SALESit) + eit 
 
(3-2) 
NDAit =  â0 (1/Ait-1) + â1 [{(1+k)△REVit– △ARit}/Ait-1] + â2 (PPEit/Ait-1)  
+ â3 (TA it-1/Ait-2) + â4 (△REVit+1/SALESit) 
 
(4-1) 
DA3it = (TA it/Ait-1) – NDAit (5-1) 
 
TAit : Total accruals of firm i in year t (Net Income – Cash Flows from Operations)  
ΔREVit : Changes in sales of firm i in year t 
ΔARit : Changes in accounts receivables of firm i in year t  
PPEit : Plant, Property, and Equipments of firm i in year t 
Ait-1 : Total assets of firm i at the beginning year t 
DA3it : Discretionary accruals estimated by industry and year using the Forward looking model of firm i in year t 
NDAit : Non discretionary accruals of firm i in year t 
 
Since there is a correlation between performance and accruals, it is problematic to test EM if performance 
is not properly controlled. Kothari et al (2005) control for the impact of performance on estimated DA using a 
performance-matched firm's DA. This is called Performance-matched discretionary accrual approach. Their 
matching process is based upon ROAs (return on assets). We estimate DA using this approach, and a performance-
matched firm‟s DA is defined as the difference between DA and the median of portfolio DAs. DA from the 
Performance matched model means firm's variation from the median of portfolio DAs of the same year and the same 
industry.  
 
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2009 Volume 8, Number 7 
34 
DA 2it = DA 1it – DA1t
median
 (6) 
 
DA2it : Discretionary accruals estimated by industry and year using the Performance matched model of firm i in 
year t 
 
We include five control variables in [Model 1] that are expected to influence manager's EM: the absolute 
value of cash flows from operations (|OCF|), size (SIZE), debt ratio (LEV), trends dummy (TIME), and audit quality 
(AUDIT).  
 
Prior literature suggests that manager's incentive to upward reported earnings is increased when firms have 
less cash flow from operations (Dechow et al. 1995; Becker et al. 1998; Defond and Subramanyam 1998; Yoon, 
1998). We include it in [Model 1] as the absolute value of cash flow from operations because the absolute value of 
DA is used for a proxy of the magnitude of EM following Kim and Seo (2005). We expect a positive relationship 
between EM and |OCF|. We measure a firm's size as log of total assets at the beginning of fiscal year and this is 
working as a proxy for omitted variables. We anticipate the magnitude of EM is greater for small firms because their 
earnings tend to fluctuate more than large firms. Debt ratio (LEV) is measured as total debts divided by total assets
8
 
at the beginning of fiscal year. Prior evidence on debt ratio is not conclusive; prior research show both positive 
relationships with DA (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994) and negative relationships with DA (DeAngelo et al. 1994; 
Yoon, 2001; Ashbaugh et al. 2002). Since we are using the absolute value of DA, we expect a positive relationship 
between the magnitude of EM and debt ratio despite conflicting results of prior research. Trends dummy (TIME) is 
included to control for macro economic factors in the study period. Cohen and Lys (2005) document an increasing 
trend in accrual-based EM before SOX and a reversal of it after SOX. We expect a positive relationship between 
trends dummy and EM. We include an audit quality in the model and use the size of an external auditor (AUDIT) as 
a proxy. Prior literature documents that EM is effectively limited by higher audit quality and they use the size of 
external auditor as a proxy (DeAngelo, 1981; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1993; Becker et al. 1998; Fransis and Krishnan, 
1999; Krishnan, 2003). We anticipate manager's EM is limited if their external auditors belong to a Big 4.  
 
3.3  Sample Selection 
 
Our sample consists of 5,284 listed firms on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) from 1993 to 2006
9
, and 
obtained from Fn-DataGuidePro database. We restrict our sample to non-financial firms and we require that each 
firm-year observation has the data necessary to calculate DA and ERC we employed in our analysis. Further, each 
firm-year observation has to be fiscal year ending in December to secure homogeneity. The distinction between 
large and small and medium sized firms is based on the Basic Act on Small and Medium Sized Companies in Korea 
and we designate 2,970 large firm-year observations as adopters of the IACS Standards and 2,314 small and medium 
firm-year observations as non adopters by this Rule. To test H2 and H2-1, we use stock returns that are obtained 
from Fn-DataGuidePro database. Requiring stock returns results in a smaller sample consisting of 2,134 and 1,585 
firm-year observations for large and small and medium sized firms, respectably.  
 
Panels A and B of Table 1 report sample distributions by year and by industry. Large firm-year 
observations are 56% of the samples and show a relatively even spread over years. For industry distribution, the 
chemicals industry shows the largest representation (16% for adopters, 16.5% for non-adopters) and relatively large 
portion of non adopters are included in the electronics and textile products industries. In the case of Communication, 
all of the sample firms are classified as adopters, which is not surprising considering the large size of these firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
8 We use total assets as a denominator because using net assets may result in negative numbers, which can distort the continuity of firm's 
debt ratio. 
9 Future sales growth is required to estimate NDA with the Forward looking model. Data of 2007 is excluded from this study because 
sales figures in 2008 are not available yet. 
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Table 1 
Sample distribution 
Panel A: Time Distribution 
              # of firms 
Year 
Freq(Adopters) Freq(Non-adopters) Total 
1993 185 120 305 
1994 183 131 314 
1995 185 142 327 
1996 187 149 336 
1997 191 159 350 
1998 198 168 366 
1999 213 172 385 
2000 212 176 388 
2001 222 177 399 
2002 223 177 400 
2003 240 179 419 
2004 255 187 442 
2005 238 191 429 
2006 238 186 424 
Total 2,970(56%) 2,314(44%) 5,284(100%) 
 
Panel B: Industry Distribution 
Industry Code Freq(Adopters) % Freq(Non-adopters) % 
Food products I.005 270 9% 119 5% 
Textile products I.006 159 5% 154 7% 
Paper and Paper products I.007 124 4% 117 5% 
Chemical products I.008 485 16% 383 16.5% 
Medicine I.009 183 6% 94 4% 
Nonmetal Minerals I.010 155 5% 98 4% 
Metal and Steels I.011 224 8% 159 7% 
Machine I.012 142 5% 214 9% 
Electronics I.013 251 8% 306 13% 
Health I.014 30 1% 11 0.5% 
Transportation I.015 203 7% 127 5% 
Distributions I.016 179 6% 198 8% 
Electricity and Gas I.017 55 2% 37 2% 
Construction I.018 222 7.5% 109 5% 
Transport and Storage I.019 102 3.5% 62 3% 
Communications I.020 19 1% 0 0% 
Services I.026 116 4% 62 3% 
Manufacturing I.027 51 2% 64 3% 
Total  2,970 100% 2,314 100% 
Notes to Table 1:  
This classification is by Fn-DataGuidePro database 
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IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 reports summary statistics on earnings management and informativeness measures of the sample; 
full sample, adopters, and non-adopters.   
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Full sample 
Full Sample Variables Mean Std.Dev Q2 Median Q4 
Variables in 
Model 1 
(N=5,284) 
|DA1| 0.056 0.050 0.018 0.043 0.079 
|DA2| 0.054 0.049 0.017 0.040 0.077 
|DA3| 0.055 0.048 0.019 0.042 0.078 
|OCF| 0.081 0.065 0.031 0.066 0.115 
SIZE 19.09 1.206 18.00 19.00 20.00 
LEV 0.599 0.247 0.423 0.591 0.751 
AUDIT 0.667 0.471 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Variables in 
Model 2 
(N=3,808) 
RETURN 0.214 0.763 -0.209 0.063 0.442 
EARN 0.153 0.280 0.042 0.098 0.212 
YEAREARN 0.009 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LOSS 0.041 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LOSSEARN -0.007 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 
YEARELOSSEARN -0.0003 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MV 11.11 1.276 10.19 10.94 11.85 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics: adopters 
Adopters Variables Mean Std.Dev Q2 Median Q4 
Variables in 
Model 1 
(N=2,970) 
|DA1| 0.052 0.046 0.017 0.040 0.072 
|DA2| 0.049 0.045 0.015 0.037 0.071 
|DA3| 0.050 0.044 0.018 0.039 0.071 
|OCF| 0.080 0.063 0.033 0.067 0.112 
SIZE 19.06 1.126 19.00 20.00 20.00 
LEV 0.625 0.244 0.456 0.621 0.781 
AUDIT 0.782 0.412 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Variables in 
Model 2 
(N=2,223) 
RETURN 0.239 0.763 -0.206 0.086 0.509 
EARN 0.155 0.263 0.045 0.098 0.215 
YEAREARN 0.009 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LOSS 0.034 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LOSSEARN -0.007 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000 
YEARELOSSEARN -0.0003 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MV 11.62 1.245 10.73 11.46 12.34 
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Table 2 (continued) Panel C: Descriptive Statistics: Non adopters 
Non adopters Variables Mean Std.Dev Q2 Median Q4 
Variables in Model 
1 
(N=2,314) 
|DA1| 0.062 0.054 0.020 0.048 0.087 
|DA2| 0.059 0.052 0.019 0.045 0.083 
|DA3| 0.061 0.053 0.020 0.047 0.088 
|OCF| 0.082 0.068 0.029 0.064 0.120 
SIZE 18.34 0.827 18.00 18.00 19.00 
LEV 0.566 0.247 0.380 0.552 0.717 
AUDIT 0.519 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Variables in Model 
2 
(N=1,585) 
RETURN 0.179 0.762 -0.215 0.039 0.372 
EARN 0.150 0.218 0.039 0.096 0.205 
YEAREARN 0.009 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LOSS 0.050 0.218 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LOSSEARN -0.007 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 
YEARELOSSEARN -0.0003 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MV 10.41 0.939 9.78 10.31 10.93 
Definition of Variables:  
|DA1it| : Absolute value of DA of firm i in year t estimated by the Modified Jones model  
|DA2it| : Absolute value of DA of firm i in year t estimated by the Performance matched model 
|DA3it| : Absolute value of DA of firm i in year t estimated by the Forward looking model 
|OCFit| : Absolute value of current cash flows from operations 
SIZEit : Natural log of total assets 
LEVit : Debt ratio of firm i in year t (total debt / total assets)  
AUDITit : Audit quality dummy of firm i in year t(1 if an external auditor is Big4, 0 otherwise)  
RETURNit : Stock returns of firm i in year t [(Changes in Pricet + Dividends )/ Pricet-1]  
EARNit : Income before tax of firm i in year t(Income before taxt / Pricet-1]  
YEAREARNit : Interaction term(YEARt×EARNit) 
LOSSit : Loss firm dummy(1 if EARNit is negative, 0 otherwise )  
LOSSEARNit : Interaction term(LOSSit×EARNit) 
YEARLOSSEARNit : Interaction term(YEARt×LOSSit×EARNit) 
MVit : Natural log of market value of firm i in year t (Log of MV) 
 
 
Panel B of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for adopters of the IACS Standards. Their total assets, cash 
flows from operations, and debt ratio are larger than those of non-adopters on average and this is not surprising 
because their classification is based on their sizes. Table 2 shows that the mean of absolute value of DA estimated 
from the Modified Jones model(|DA1it|) for adopters is smaller than that of non-adopters meaning that the magnitude 
of EM is relatively large for non-adopters(0.052 for adopters and 0.062 for non-adopters). This is true for DAs 
estimated using other models, the Performance matched model and the Forward looking model. The mean is slightly 
lower for |DA2| than |DA1| or |DA3| and this is because DA2 is estimated as the difference between a firm's DA and the 
median of industry portfolio DAs. Regarding the size of external auditors, the mean is each 0.782 and 0.519 for 
adopters and non-adopters, respectively and this means as larger firms tend to be audited by BIG4 auditors.  
 
The means of stock returns(RETURN) and income before tax(EARN) for adopters are higher than non-
adopters whereas the mean of loss firms(LOSS) is lower, meaning that loss firms are more included in non-adopters 
(small and medium sized firms). Market values of adopters are larger than those of non-adopters on average, which 
is expected because adopter are the firms whose total assets are greater than 2 trillion Korean Won as of the end of 
2005. 
 
Table 3 reports correlations among variables for adopters. Panel A is for [Model 1] that tests the change in 
EM before and after the IACS Standards periods, and Panel B is for [Model 2] that tests the change in earnings 
informativeness. 
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Table 3 
Correlations among variables for adopters 
Panel A: Correlations among variables for adopters [Model 1] 
Variables 
(N=2,970) 
|DA1| |DA2| |DA3| YEAR |OCF| SIZE LEV AUDIT 
|DA1| 1.000 
0.891 0.814 -0.030 0.291 -0.097 0.122 -0.019 
(<0.001***) (<0.001***) ( 0.093* ) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) ( 0.295 ) 
|DA2| 
 
1.000 
0.739 -0.033 0.331 -0.094 0.108 -0.012 
 (<0.001***) ( 0.064* ) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) ( 0.506 ) 
|DA3| 
  
1.000 
-0.023 0.267 -0.090 0.089 -0.006 
  ( 0.207 ) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) ( 0.717 ) 
YEAR 
   
1.000 
-0.013 0.053 -0.148 0.002 
   ( 0.447 ) (<0.003***) ( 0.001***) ( 0.900 ) 
|OCF| 
    
1.000 
-0.024 -0.083 0.075 
    ( 0.189 ) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) 
SIZE 
     
1.000 
0.120 0.259 
     (<0.001***) (<0.001***) 
LEV 
      
1.000 
0.031 
      ( 0.089* ) 
AUDIT 
       
1.000 
       
Notes to Panel A of Table 3: 
Pearson coefficients 
***: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level 
|DA1it| : Absolute value of DA of firm i in year t estimated by the Modified Jones model  
|DA2it| : Absolute value of DA of firm i in year t estimated by the Performance matched model 
|DA3it| : Absolute value of DA of firm i in year t estimated by the Forward looking model 
|OCFit| : Absolute value of current cash flows from operations 
SIZEit : Natural log of total assets 
LEVit : Debt ratio of firm i in year t (total debt / total assets)  
AUDITit : Audit quality dummy of firm i in year t(1 if an external auditor is Big4, 0 otherwise)  
 
 
The correlation between |DA1| and |DA2| and the correlation between |DA1| and |DA3| are 0.891 and 0.814 
respectively, which means that results from three models are consistent. The main variable of interest in [Model 1], 
YEAR dummy is significantly negatively correlated with |DA|s from the Modified Jones and the Performance 
matched models. This implies that the magnitude of EM for adopters is reduced after the enforcement of the IACS 
Standards. As we expected, |DA| is negatively correlated with firm's size and positively correlated with debt ratio. 
But we do not find a significant correlation between |DA| and the size of external auditors (AUDIT), whereas firm's 
size is positively correlated with AUDIT. It means that larger firms tend to get audited by the BIG 4.  
 
The correlation between stock returns (RETURN) and income before tax (EARN) is 0.326 and the 
correlation between RETURN and loss before tax (LOSS) is -0.058, meaning that high accounting earnings imply 
high stock returns. Correlations between EARN and YEAR, and RETURN and YEAR are -0.048 and -0.057, 
respectably. That implies there is a decrease on earnings and stock returns after the enforcement of the IACS 
Standards in 2006
10
. The correlation between YEAR and LOSS is 0.055, meaning that the number of loss firms 
increased after the enforcement of the IACS Standards. As we can see from the positive correlation between 
YEAREARN and RETURN (0.036, significant at the 10% level), the explanatory power of accounting income on 
returns is improved after the enforcement of the IACS Standards.  
                                           
10 Recall that year 2006 is when IACS Standards was the first enforced for larger firms. Therefore the dummy variable, YEAR, take the 
value of 1 for 2006, and 0 for all other years. 
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We test multicollinearity among independent variables, and do not find any variables with VIF above 10, 
and the maximum VIF is 2.4 in [Model 2]. 
 
 
Table 3 (continued) Panel B: Correlations among variables for adopters [Model 2] 
Variables 
(N=2,223) 
YEAR RETURN EARN YEAREARN LOSS LOSSEARN 
YEARELOSS 
EARN 
MV 
YEAR 1.000 
-0.048 -0.057 0.691 0.055 0.009 0.199 0.197 
( 0.022**) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) ( 0.665 ) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) 
RETURN 
 
1.000 
0.326 0.036 -0.058 -0.040 0.028 0.228 
 (<0.001***) ( 0.085* ) (<0.001***) ( 0.055*) ( 0.180) (<0.001***) 
EARN 
  
1.000 
0.046 -0.271 0.5477 0.055 -0.019 
  ( 0.028**) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) ( 0.350 ) 
YEAREARN 
   
1.000 
0.079 0.016 0.131 0.139 
   (<0.001***) ( 0.434 ) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) 
LOSS 
    
1.000 
-0.299 -0.323 -0.092 
    (<0.001***) (<0.001***) (<0.001***) 
LOSSEARN 
     
1.000 
0.034 0.0548 
     ( 0.102 ) (<0.001***) 
YEARELOSS 
EARN 
      
1.000 
0.015 
      ( 0.459 ) 
MV 
       
1.000 
       
Notes to Panel B of Table 3: 
Pearson coefficient 
***: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level 
RETURNit : Stock returns of firm i in year t [(Changes in Pricet + Dividends ) / Pricet-1]  
EARNit : Income before tax of firm i in year t(Income before taxt / Pricet-1]  
YEARt : Year dummy for enforcement of the IACS Standards(1 if year t is enforced, 0 otherwise) 
YEAREARNit : Interaction term(YEARt×EARNit) 
LOSSit : Loss firm dummy(1 if EARNit is negative, 0 otherwise)  
LOSSEARNit : Interaction term(LOSSit×EARNit) 
YEARLOSSEARNit : Interaction term(YEARt×LOSSit×EARNit) 
MVit : Natural log of market value of firm i in year t (Log of MV) 
 
 
4.2  EM changes before and after the IACS Standards 
 
We employ multivariate regression analysis to investigate changes in EM before and after the enforcement 
of the IACS Standards. Table 4 provides the results of testing H1 of [Model 1]. Model (A), (B), and (C) are the 
results estimated by the Modified Jones model, the Performance matched model, and the Forward looking model 
respectably. Panel A of Table 4 shows that 𝛂1, coefficient of YEAR dummy, is significantly negative at the 10% 
level in both Models (A) and (B) and at the 5% level in Model(C). This means a significant decrease in EM for 
adopters, and we interpret this result as enforcement of the IACS Standards in 2006 having a positive effect on 
decreasing earnings management for adopters.  
 
Other control variables are significant with expected signs, except for the size of external auditor (AUDIT). 
This result is consistent over 3 models, (A), (B), and (C). We find that large firms tend to have low EM, while firms 
with higher debt ratio or larger |OCF| tend to have higher EM. The finding that the size of external auditor (AUDIT) 
is not significant in explaining EM is consistent with prior study (Shin, 2007). The increasing trend in EM over the 
period in our study was also observed in Cohen and Lys (2005). In summary, we conclude that the level of EM is 
reduced for adopters after the enforcement of the IACS Standards, which supports H1. 
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Panel B of Table 4 provides the test results of H1-1, which examine whether there are changes in EM for 
non-adopters before and after the enforcement of the IACS Standards. The main variable of interest again is the 
YEAR dummy and the coefficient is negative but insignificant for all three models. This means that there are no 
significant changes in EM for non-adopters. We can interpret this result as supporting H1-1.   
 
Results on other control variables turned out to be as expected in prior research. There is no difference for 
control variables between the adopters and non-adopters, except for the size of external auditor (AUDIT). We find 
that the coefficient of AUDIT for non-adopters is negatively related with |DA|, a proxy of EM, at 1% level. This 
implies that manager's ability to manage earnings is reduced when non-adopters (small and medium sized firms) are 
audited by a BIG 4. 
 
4.3  Informativeness changes before and after the IACS Standards 
 
In Table 5 we provide test results of H2 and H2-1 to see whether there are changes of informativeness of 
accounting information after the enforcement of the IACS Standards. We measure the informativeness with earnings 
response coefficients (ERC), which is a relation between earnings and returns. 
 
The main variable of interest in [Model 2], EARNYEAR, showed a significantly positive coefficient (𝛂3 
=1.241) at 5% level after the enforcement of the IACS Standards for adopters. On the other hand, the coefficient is 
almost 0 (𝛂3 = 0.001), and statistically insignificant for non-adopters. This implies that informativeness of 
accounting earnings improved for adopters, but there was no improvement for non-adopters after the enforcement of 
the IACS Standards in 2006. So both H2 and H2-1 are supported.  
 
The results of [Model 2] for both adopters and non-adopters are very similar, except for EARNYEAR, the 
variable of interest. We note positive coefficients of market value (MV) at 1% significance level (1.166, 0.201), 
which implies that stock returns are higher as firms get larger. We find that there is a significant decrease of stock 
returns for both adopters and non-adopters (coefficients of YEAR for adopter and non-adopters are -0.337 and -0.234, 
respectably) after the enforcement of the IACS Standards in 2006. And the effect of concurrent earnings (losses) on 
stock returns are significantly positive (negative) for both adopters and non-adopters at 1% significance level (𝛂2 = 
1.461, 1.583 and 𝛂5 = -1.852, -1.737 for adopters and non-adopters, respectively). This means accounting 
information has explanatory power on stock returns for both adopters and non-adopters, regardless whether earnings 
are positive or not.  
 
It can be concluded that the enforcement of the IACS Standards which is meant to provide a standardized 
guideline for operating and evaluating internal accounting control system turned out to be effective in the sense that 
the adopters of the Standards exhibited significant decrease (increase) in earnings management (informativeness of 
accounting numbers) while there was no significant change in both EM and informativeness for non-adopters. 
 
4.4  Additional Analysis 
 
Since there are concerns about using absolute value, unsigned discretionary accruals on EM study (Hribar 
and Nichols, 2007), we conduct additional tests using “signed discretionary accruals (DA)” as a proxy of accrual-
based EM to provide construct validity for our results. We examine whether the reliability of accounting numbers is 
improved after the enforcement of the IACS Standards using this proxy. Untabulated results are very similar with 
those reported in this paper, main variable of interest and control variables, and only for adopters, the level of 
accrual-based EM decreases and that of non-adopters is not associated with the enforcement of the IACS Standards. 
We infer that the reliability of accounting earnings increases and the enforcement of the IACS Standards is effective 
only for adopters.  
 
It is possible that including years from 1997 to 1999 in the study period may have resulted in an extraneous 
result because there was a serious economic crisis in Korea. We examine our analyses excluding those years, and 
untabulated results are qualitatively the same as those reported in the paper. We also add an industry dummy 
variable in our models to control for the influence of industrial characteristics on EM, and find similar results. 
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Table 4 
Results of Hypothesis 1 and 1-1 
Panel A: Results of H1 (Adopters) 
[Model 1] |DAit| = 𝛂0 + 𝛂1YEARt + 𝛂2| OCFit| + 𝛂3SIZEit + 𝛂4LEVit + 𝛂5TIME + 𝛂6AUDITit + eit 
 Study period 
Estimation 
model 
𝛂0 𝛂1 𝛂2 𝛂3 𝛂4 𝛂5 𝛂6 𝑭value 𝑹 
2 
Coefficient 
(t-statistics) 
1993~2006 
(N= 2,970) 
(A) 
0.103 
(7.24***) 
-0.005 
(-1.71*) 
0.224 
(17.6***) 
-0.005 
(-6.70***) 
0.039 
(10.2***) 
0.001 
(4.49***) 
-0.002 
(-1.03) 
70.58*** 0.13 
(B) 
0.095 
(6.87***) 
-0.005 
(-1.75*) 
0.249 
(20.0***) 
-0.004 
(-6.40***) 
0.035 
(9.43***) 
0.0009 
(3.91***) 
-0.001 
(-0.86) 
83.28*** 0.14 
(C) 
0.100 
(7.21***) 
-0.006 
(-2.06**) 
0.194 
(15.7***) 
-0.004 
(-6.50***) 
0.032 
(8.76***) 
0.001 
(5.35***) 
-0.0004 
(-0.21) 
56.31*** 0.10 
 
Panel B: Results of H1-1(Non adopters) 
[Model 1] |DAit| = 𝛂0 + 𝛂1YEARt + 𝛂2| OCFit| + 𝛂3SIZEit + 𝛂4LEVit + 𝛂5TIME + 𝛂6AUDITit + eit 
 Study period 
Estimation 
model 
𝛂0 𝛂1 𝛂2 𝛂3 𝛂4 𝛂5 𝛂 6 𝑭value 𝑹 
2 
Coefficient 
(t-statistics) 
 
1993~2006 
(N= 2,314) 
 
(A) 
0.064 
(2.69***) 
-0.005 
(-1.28) 
0.213 
(13.5***) 
-0.002 
(-2.06**) 
0.045 
(9.17***) 
0.001 
(3.31***) 
-0.005 
(-2.73***) 
45.33*** 0.11 
(B) 
0.047 
(2.07**) 
-0.005 
(-1.19) 
0.246 
(16.3***) 
-0.002 
(-1.71*) 
0.043 
(9.09***) 
0.001 
(3.90***) 
-0.004 
(-2.28**) 
58.05*** 0.13 
(C) 
0.078 
(3.30***) 
-0.006 
(-1.47) 
0.182 
(11.7***) 
-0.003 
(-2.57***) 
0.042 
(8.73***) 
0.001 
(3.99***) 
-0.006 
(-2.96***) 
36.64*** 0.09 
Notes to Table 4: 
(A) uses |DA1it| computed using the Modified Jones model, (B)uses |DA2it| computed using the Performance matched model, (C)uses|DA3it| computed using the Forward looking model 
***
: significant at the 1% level, 
**
: significant at the 5% level, 
*
: significant at the 10%   
 
Table 5 
Results of Hypothesis 2 and 2-1 
[Model 2] RETURNit = 𝛂 0 + 𝛂 1YEARt + 𝛂 2EARNit + 𝛂 3YEAREARNit + 𝛂 4LOSSit + 𝛂 5LOSSEARNit + 𝛂 6YEARLOSSEARNit + 𝛂 7MVit + eit    
 Study period 𝛂 0 𝛂 1 𝛂 2 𝛂 3 𝛂 4 𝛂 5 𝛂 6 𝛂 7 𝑭value 𝑹 
2 
Coefficient 
(t-statistics) 
 
Adopters 
1993~2006 
(N= 2,223) 
-1.927 
(-14.5***) 
-0.337 
(-4.36***) 
1.461 
(22.4***) 
1.241 
(2.54**) 
0.044 
(0.52) 
-1.852 
(-14.5***) 
-3.452 
(-1.09) 
0.166 
(14.3***) 
104.28*** 0.24 
Non-adopters 
1993~2006 
(N= 1,585) 
-2.150 
(-11.2***) 
-0.234 
(-2.50**) 
1.583 
(19.1***) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.071 
(0.72) 
-1.737 
(-4.04***) 
-0.920 
(-0.51) 
0.201 
(11.0***) 
72.16*** 0.24 
***: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level, *: significant at the 10%   
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of enforcing the IACS Standards in Korea in 2006 by analyzing 
changes in earnings management (EM) and the informativeness of accounting numbers. There are only a few studies 
dealing with the effectiveness of the IACS in Korea, and they covered the early period of the IACS implementation 
when the general concept of the IACS was simply imported from the U.S.A. and the Standards were not yet 
established. We examine the effects of enforcing the IACS Standards and extend our analysis to capital markets to 
more directly examine the informativeness of accounting numbers. We try to infer the effectiveness of the IACS 
Standards from the analysis of changes in EM and in accounting informativeness.  
 
We decompose our sample into two groups, adopters of the IACS Standards in 2006 (2,970 firm-year 
observations) and non-adopters (2,134 firm-year observations). The absolute value of discretionary accruals 
estimated from three models; (1) the Modified Jones model, (2) the Performance matched model, and (3) the 
Forward looking model is used as proxies for EM. We examine whether there are significant changes in EM before 
and after the enforcement of the IACS Standards in [Model 1]. We also test whether there are changes in accounting 
informativeness after the enforcement of the IACS Standards using ERC. 
 
Our results show a significant decrease of discretionary accruals for adopters after the enforcement of the 
IACS Standards whereas no changes are detected for non-adopters. We conclude that manager's ability to manage 
earnings is effectively restricted by the enforcement of the IACS Standards in 2006. The coefficients of other control 
variables are consistent with prior literature. Accounting informativeness is improved after the enforcement of the 
IACS Standards for adopters whereas no changes are observed for non-adopters. We can conclude that these results 
enforcing the IACS Standards to large corporations in 2006 turned out to be effective. We believe that these results 
indicate that the IACS contributed to improvements in reliability and transparency of accounting numbers. These 
results are potentially useful to researchers and regulators as well as standard setters engaged in developing and 
implementing the IACS.  
 
Our results are early evidence on the effectiveness of the IACS and it is expected to get more meaningful 
results by expanding samples to non listed firms in the further studies.  
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
Sun-A Kang, Ph. D. Candidate, Senior Researcher at ETRI(Electronics & Telecommunications Research Institute), 
Rep. of Korea. Sun-A Kang was educated at Chungman National University, in the Rep. of Korea, where she 
obtained a first class honors degree of B.A. in 1996. She got M.A in Business administration at Sogang University in 
1999 and now she is a Ph.D. candidate in the same field. In 1998, she has passed AICPA examination and got a 
license in 2006. She worked at Samil accounting firm, which is an associated firms of PWC in 2000 and joined ETRI 
(Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute) from 2001, and she is currently working as a senior 
researcher of Technology Strategy Research Division. She has been currently serving as an expertise in 
standardization of APT(Asia Pacific Telecommunity) since 2006. She has interested in financial accounting, 
especially earnings management, auditing, and regulatory cost accounting.  
 
Sung-Bin Chun, Ph. D., Professor of Sogang Business School, Sogang University, Seoul, Rep. of Korea. Pf. Sun-
Bin Chun was educated at Sogang University, in the Rep. of Korea, where she obtained B.A in English literature in 
1975 and got Ph.D in Business administration at University of California, Berkeley in 1984. She was an assistant 
professor of New York University from 1983 to 1985 and is a current professor of Sogang University from 1985. She 
is a current dean of Sogang Business School and has involved many activities in public and academic areas such as 
Operating Committee of Sogang Sharing & Caring Place and University Affairs Committee. She is an editor of 
Accounting and Auditing research in Korea. She has interested in financial accounting, financial statement analysis, 
corporate bankruptcy, and disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2009 Volume 8, Number 7 
43 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Application Guideline of Standards, 2005, Operating Committee of Internal Accounting Control System, 
Korea Listed Companies Association. 
2. Ashbaugh. H., R. LaFond, and B. Mayhew. 2003, "Do non-Audit services compromise auditor 
Independence? Further Evidence," The Accounting Review 78: 611-639. 
3. Ball. R and P. Brown., 1968, “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers,” The Journal of 
Accounting Research 6(Autumn): 159-178. 
4. Bae, Khee Su. 2005, “A Study on the Modulation Effect of ERP System in Earnings Management,” The 
Accounting Review, Vol.10 (2): 325-354. 
5. Bartov, E. and P. Mohanram. 2004, "Private Information, Earning Manipulations, and Executive Stock-
option Exercises," The Accounting Review79: 889-920. 
6. Bartov. E., F. Gul, and J. Tsui. 2001, "Discretionary Accruals Models and Audit Qualifications," Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 30: 99-126. 
7. Burgstahler, D. and I. Dichev. 1997, "Earning Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses," 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(December):99-129. 
8. Cho, H. W. and K. Y. Yoo. 2006, "Internal Control System and Reliability of Accounting Information," 
Accounting and Auditing Researches, Vol.44:119-145. 
9. Choi, S. K. and K. M. Kim. 2001, "Corporate Control and Earnings Management,” Korean Accounting 
Review, Vol.26: 153-175. 
10. Cohen, D., A. A. Dey, and T. Lys. 2008, "Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and 
Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods," Accounting Review 83(3):757-787.   
11. Collins. D. W. and P. Hribar. 1999, "Error in Estimating Accruals: Implication for Empirical Research," 
working paper, University of Iowa. 
12. Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1995, "Detecting Earning Management," The Accounting Review 
70: 193-225. 
13. Dechow, P., S. Richardson, and I. Tuna. 2003, "Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings 
Management Explanation," Review of Accounting Studis 8: 355-384. 
14. Easton, P. and T. Harris. 1991, "Earnings as an Explanatory Variable for Returns," Journal of Accounting 
and Research, Vol.29 No.1: 19-36. 
15. Francis, J., and J. Krishnan. 1999, "Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism," 
Contemporary Accounting Research 16: 135-165. 
16. Hayn, C. 1995, "The Information Contents of Losses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
20(September):125-153. 
17. Healy, P. and J. Wahlen. 1999, "A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implementations 
for Standard Setting," Accounting Horizons 13(December):365-384. 
18. Jain, P. K. and Z. Rezaee. 2004, "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Accounting Conservatism," 
working paper, University of Memphis  
19. Jones, J. J. 1991, "Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations," Journal of Accounting 
Research 29:193-228. 
20. Kim, K. H. and R. C. Kang. 2006, “Accounting for Investment in Securities and Income Smoothing,” 
Accounting Review, Vol. 11(3): 229-246. 
21. Kim, Y. T. and J. W. Seo. 2005, “Stock Repurchase and Information Effect of Accounting Earnings: 
Evidence from Discretionary Accounting Choices,” Korean Accounting Review, Vol.30 No.1: 1-25. 
22. Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. E. Wasley. 2005, “Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual 
Measures,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 39(January):163-197. 
23. Krishnan, G. 2003, "Audit Quality and the Pricing of Discretionary Accruals," Auditing: A journal of 
Practice and Theory 22: 109-126. 
24. Li, Haidan, M. Pincus, and S. O. Rego. 2006, "Market Reaction to Events Surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 and Earnings Management," working paper, University of Iowa  
25. Lobo, G. J. and J. Zhou. 2006, "Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act?  Initial Evidence," Accounting Horizons, Vol.20 No.1: 57-73. 
26. Nelson, M., J. Elliott, and R. Tarpley. 2002, "Evidence from Auditors about Managers' and Auditors' 
Earnings Management Decisions," The Accounting Review 77(Supplement): 175-202. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – July 2009 Volume 8, Number 7 
44 
27. Opinion letter 05-1 of Application Guideline: Implementing period of Standards of IACS. 2005, Operating 
Committee of Internal Accounting Control System, Korea Listed Companies Association. 
28. Sabramnanuam, .K. R. 1996, "The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals," Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 22: 249-281. 
29. Schipper, K. 1989, "Commentary on Earnings Management," Accounting Horizons 3(December): 91-102. 
30. Shin, Hyun Geol. 2007, "Analysis of Review Reports on Internal Control Systems," Accounting Journal, 
Vol.16 No.1: 107-128. 
31. Standards of IACS, 2005, Operating Committee of Internal Accounting Control System, Korea Listed 
Companies Association. 
32. Warfield. T., J. Wild, and K. Wild. 1995, "Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices, and 
Informativeness of Earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics 20: 61-91. 
33. Yoon, Soon Suk. 2001, "A Comparison of Earnings Management between KSE Firms and KOSDAQ 
Firms," Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, Vol.29: 57-85. 
34. Yoon, Soon Suk. 1998, "A Study of Earnings Management using Cash Flows from Operations," Korean 
Accounting Review, Vol.23: 107-12 
 
 
NOTES 
